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REUEL SCHILLER, PETER EDELMAN, DAVID LEVINE,
AND THOMAS DAVIDOFF
DEAN REUEL SCHILLER: We have a very interesting panel
here on social security and social security reform. My name is Reuel
Schiller. I am a professor here at Hastings and it is my pleasure to
introduce our panel. We have a fantastic panel today to discuss
social security.
On my immediate left is Peter Edelman, who is a professor of
law at Georgetown University where he specializes in welfare and
poverty law and constitutional law. Prior to that, he was the
assistant secretary for the Department of Health and Human
Services in the Clinton Administration and it is fair to say had a
falling out with the administration over welfare reform in the mid-
90s.
He is also the author most recently of "Searching for America's
Heart, RFK,"-that is Robert Kennedy-"and the Renewal of
Hope."
To his immediate left is U.C. Berkeley's David I. Levine.
Professor Levine is a professor at the Haas School of Business
Administration. He is in the Economic Analysis and Policy group as
well as the Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations group.
He specializes on the impact of social security on the economy,
structural wage and inequality issues and worker participation in
the economy. He is the author -he has told me I am only allowed to
say one of his books-of, "Reinventing the Workplace: How
Business and Employees Can Both Win."
Finally, I have Thomas Davidoff who is also a professor at U.C.
Berkeley School of Business at the Haas School and is part of the
Real-Estate group. He specializes in urban economics, public
finance and income stabilization. He has also written about the
asset holding of the elderly, which as you can imagine, is quite
relevant to social security and also the roles of annuities in
individual welfare.
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What I thought we would do is start with a little overview of
what social security is before we move to talking about the crisis of
social security and the various reform plans. I wanted to start with
Professor Edelman and just ask for a brief discussion of why social
security was established and how the system works to help different
constituencies.
PROFESSOR PETER EDELMAN: I am glad to be here. Let me
begin with some brief history. There was a physician who lived in
Long Beach, California whose name was Francis Townsend. He had
a job in the County Medical Office and he had lost it because of the
Depression. I guess he had time on his hands. He came up with a
plan for a national system of retirement support for people in this
country.
It was the early stages of the Depression and it caught on. It
had enough political insistence about it that President Roosevelt
picked it up. We perhaps tend to think of the New Deal in
retrospect as though all of its pieces were part of a strategy. In fact,
they were trying anything and everything about a lot of problems.
And so he proposed social security.
Frances Perkins, who was the Secretary of Labor, the first
woman cabinet member in our history, was a key person in working
for the administration to get it enacted.
Originally the idea was that it would accumulate money from
payroll taxes, and it would not come into actual effect to pay
anybody until 1942. But then because the money was piling up and
people were hurting, a politics developed in the late 1930s, and the
government started having to pay people before it really had the
money piled up to pay them.
Of course this is all in nominal dollars, but in comparison to
today's 12.6 percent payroll tax on employees and employers
combined, it was two percent. In comparison to today's $90,000
limit on the amount of income that is taxed, the ceiling basis for
calculating the benefits, the contributory and benefit base, at the
beginning was $3,000.
This is an important point. Social security has always been
conceived as, and fundamentally is, a social insurance program. It
was always related to the idea that it was contributory. It has
always kept alive the idea that what you get out of it is related to
what you have paid into it.
The drafters understood that there was going to come a time
when benefits would become costly enough that the payroll tax
would not pay for all of them. That is one of the issues that we
confront now, except we are not facing up to it.
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We were already confronting that issue in the mid-1960s, and
when Robert Kennedy was in the Senate, he introduced a bill to
provide that regular tax dollars, general revenues, would pay for a
piece of social security. He did that at the request of the United
Auto Workers. Kennedy's bill was not enacted.
Of course social security is a vitally important program. But the
fact is that the 12.6 percent flat tax, with anybody with income over
$90,000 not paying anymore, is a very regressive tax. If we lived in a
better world, immediately, we would be arguing for taxing people
higher up and for forgiving people at the bottom.
DEAN SCHILLER: In respect to the issue of progressivity, or
regressivity, and I do not know whether Professor Davidoff or
Professor Levine wants to address this one, how would you
characterize the way the system, as it is functioning now, affects in
particular poor communities or less empowered communities?
Communities of color or children or the elderly? What is its
disproportionate impact on those communities?
PROFESSOR THOMAS DAVIDOFF: Well, the nice thing about
the program is that it is universal and yet progressive. A program
for the poor is a poor program. So it has universal appeal, and yet
there is a progressive component built in.
First of all, no matter how little money you earn and pay in
over the course of your career, there is a floor provided by
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or the insurance part of social
security. So nobody is allowed to be horrendously poor in old age.
Then the more you pay in, the more you get, but it is not one for one
in that way.
That plays a very important role and we know that the people
who earned the least over their lifetime, even if they were saving at
the same rate as people who earned more, would have less money.
But those people are the people who saved the least.
Social security would be a very bad idea if we thought people
knew what to do with their money, because basically we are telling
people, "The government is going to save for you." That is not a
good thing if people know what they are doing.
Part of the reason for social security is we think people do not
know what they are doing. Unfortunately, at the lower end of the
income distribution, there is a correlation with low savings rates -in
some sense poor savings is part of the beauty of the social security
system, and it is progressive.
Let me just say it is a particularly wise form of progressivity,
and I have no idea if this was part of the idea at the time, because
giving low income people money today might be a way of telling
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them, "Okay, it is not so bad to be low income." But if we think that
they failed to save, then giving them money in the future when they
really need it may be particularly efficient. One, because it is when
they need the money the most, and two, because it is probably not
going to discourage the amount they work.
So it is really a very cleverly designed system and what it does
in terms of progressivity is very important.
PROFESSOR DAVID LEVINE: Let me just follow up and say
more about what it means to have a program that is universal.
There are not that many poor people who are also old in this
country. There are millions of them, we are a really big country.
But there would be about six times as many millions if it were not
for social security.
So it is phenomenally important in changing how poor the
elderly are. Now social security does not make you rich, but it
means we have vastly fewer poor elderly. It is this really
complicated sounding system, but what I want to emphasize is it is
mostly a system that pays old people with a dedicated tax.
The highway system has a dedicated gas tax, which goes to
highways, and there is a payroll tax, a somewhat regressive payroll
tax, that pays out a substantially progressive, pro-poor benefit, that
on average is quite good for the poor, in spite of what Peter has
emphasized that it is not the tax rate that any of us would have
picked for it.
The other thing about this system is that there was this funny
thing called a trust fund. That is to say, they raised taxes twenty
years ago on payroll taxes in order to raise more money than they
were actually paying out in benefits. So that is a sort of weird thing
to do because what that means is that they are paying down the
government debt.
I will be referring to something in yesterday's Wall Street
Journal, which is my favorite source, from the President's Chief
Economic Advisor, Allan Hubbard. What he said is that they are
going to propose a reform that stops the excess spending the
government does when it has extra tax revenue.
I think what is remarkable about the 1990s is that the
government was paying down its debt. What that means is that
when the baby boomers retire, something we will come back to,
there would be lower government debt.
So in the 1990s, the nation was saving for retirement. That is a
really important idea that is no longer part of social security.
DEAN SCHILLER: What is the crisis, because we hear the trust
fund running out? Is it running out by 2052? Is it running out by
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2041? One of the things that I would like to do with this panel is try
to make a distinction, or at least figure out the difference, between
genuine problems with the system that are worth fixing, and what
the crisis, as it has been portrayed, now is.
In other words, what is the actual crisis that exists versus what
is being peddled as the crisis?
PROFESSOR LEVINE: The crisis is the fault not of these three
panelists, but of me and my cohort called the infamous baby
boomers. By God, there are a ton of us. When we retire, that is
going to be really expensive. So that is a large part of the crisis. The
other part is some of us, not me, but some of us are going to get sick,
and that is really expensive.
Tom will explain some of the implications of this for the long-
term fiscal health of the country.
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: They are bad. As Dave mentioned,
the idea in the 1990s was that we were going to save for retirement,
and that split to we are going to borrow for retirement, which seems
like an unwise thing to do.
The government is essentially now borrowing a lot of money,
some of which is effectively being lent to the government by the
Social Security Administration. There is some conflict over whether
the government really owes that money back. The administration
would like to say, "They are borrowing the money from social
security and they do not have to pay it back." That makes
borrowing very inexpensive.
PROFESSOR EDELMAN: What the crisis is, if there is a crisis,
is not a social security crisis but trust fund theft. Under the
compromise of the early 1980s, which was bipartisan, there was an
increase in the payroll tax.
There was an extending of the retirement age to sixty seven that
finishes coming into effect in the year 2022. The idea was that they
would build up the trust fund, which in fact, would pay down the
debt.
You all remember that there was a $5 trillion surplus when
President Clinton left office, which in significant part had to do with
the fact that so much money had come in for the social security trust
fund. Then the current administration came in and they went and
spent all of that.
They gave it back to the rich people, they started a war, and
they did some other things that put us in the position of the trust
fund still having the obligations, but no longer having the cash.
Now the government owes $1.6 trillion to the trust fund and
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indirectly to the beneficiaries. It would very likely be
unconstitutional for the government not to pay that back, so the
issue is not whether the government will default, but how it is going
to get the money to pay the beneficiaries down the road.
The fundamental problem is that the Bush administration
essentially took the money and spent it. They took us back into a
sea of red ink so that when the time comes to pay the social security
beneficiaries, the government is either going to have to borrow more
or tax people more to pay.
So the crisis, if you want to call it that, is trust fund theft.
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: I think we need to be very careful
here, because the advocates for privatization like to say that what
they are doing is dealing with the crisis. It is very important to
know that the proposal to make private accounts is a completely
separate issue from the issue of how we ought to be funding social
security; how much we need to be saving in order to save not just
social security but also Medicare, which is actually going to be a
larger problem.
Because with social security, we know how much it is going to
cost every year, roughly. With Medicare we do not know. It is risky
and it is growing.
So there is a big issue of how much we should be saving now
because in the future tax beneficiaries are going to be a bigger
number relative to tax payers. That is an issue.
Also if we are saving, the first question is how much should we
save? We are going to retire some day, so how much should we
save out of our paycheck? Then the second question is what do you
do with your savings? Do you want to put it into stocks or do you
want to put it into bonds? The third question is where should the
savings go? Should it be under one umbrella, the Social Security
Administration, or should it be under 4 million -or more than four
million- hundreds of millions of umbrellas of individual savings
accounts?
So there are three questions. First, how much should the
government save? The Bush Administration's answer is not very
much. Question number two is stocks or bonds? The Bush
Administration's answer, not unlike many people in the Clinton
administration, thinks we should have mostly bonds, but we ought
to have some stocks also. Question number three is should the
money be invested under one umbrella or should there be many,
many different accounts set up? And that is a completely separate
issue from either stocks or bonds or how much you save. I just want
to be clear on that.
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PROFESSOR LEVINE: Just to reiterate, there is a really big
concern that the baby boomers are going to get sick, which will cost
a lot of money.
Now, poor people are going to get sick too, and that is also
going to cost a lot of money. We are not worried about them, but
we should be. That is a big problem that this whole debate ignores,
which is massively bigger than the social security shortfall, even
after trust fund theft.
The separate point, just to repeat, the tax cuts, ignoring the war
and other things, are a lot bigger than the social security shortfall.
Maybe twice as big, maybe four times-estimates vary. But the
point is if you thought the government was not saving enough and
that was the cause of the crisis, we know how to have the
government save: undo the tax cuts.
I know many of you aspire to be in the top one percent.
Nevertheless, if you undid the tax cuts even on that one percent,
that is roughly the same size as the social security shortfall.
So to the extent we think the problem is that the nation does not
save enough, we know how to fix it, which is to undo what Peter
called trust fund theft. Or undo the tax cuts on prosperous people.
Now prosperous people include some of my friends, but I do not
know if we need to destroy social security just to keep their taxes a
bit lower.
PROFESSOR EDELMAN: The point with trust fund theft is
that the Bush administration has created a huge fiscal problem for
the country. It will be a crisis down the road if we do not figure out
over a period of time a way to get the money that we need to run a
government that is decent for all of our people.
The basic point is that our problem is not social security. Our
problem is having enough money to run the government for the
things that we need to do out into the future. Social security is not
the problem. It is basically constant if you look at a projection of
what the demands are going to be. As Paul Krugman has written,
the increases that we should be worrying about and have to do
something about are in Medicare and Medicaid.
PROFESSOR LEVINE: The point is there never was a very
meaningful trust fund. There was an idea that the nation needs to
save for when the baby boomers retire. And the way the nation
saves is by having taxes bigger than current spending. That was the
policy at the end of the 1990s but that is not the policy today. As
Tom put it, we are now spending for retirement, which is not a good
way to run a nation.
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PROFESSOR EDELMAN: Let me just add one sentence to that.
Remember what he said about paying down the debt in the 1990s?
If we had continued to do that, we would have gotten to a point
where, if we needed to borrow some to pay for the baby boomers'
retirement, the national debt would have been very low and we
could easily borrow and not be running up further debt. That is
what I meant by trust fund theft.
DEAN SCHILLER: I want to get into the nature of the Bush
Administration's plan and its effects, and then alternatives. First, I
have to ask a political question which has always fascinated me with
this. It has always been the conventional wisdom in American
politics that going after social security is political suicide. It is the
third rail of American politics, and it may be that is the case for the
Bush Administration as well. I am wondering, and I guess I will
start with Peter, about what you think inspired, or what
emboldened the Administration to attempt this?
PROFESSOR EDELMAN: A lot of people on both sides of the
aisle are asking the same question. I have a theory, with two parts.
One is that President Bush has been interested in this for a long
time, not that he knew what he was talking about, but he has said
repeatedly over the years that he wants to privatize social security.
The other thing is that among the people influencing him, there is a
group of ideological free market people. I think there is a
confluence of those two things. They really believe there should not
be government involvement in anything. They have found an
opportunity in President Bush's interest in privatization.
For those people, this is the big one. There is actually a memo
that has been circulating on the Internet by some White House
staffer who said what I just said, "This is the big one, if we can do
it."
Grover Norquist, from Americans for Tax Reform, who is very
influential and very effective, is quoted as saying he wants to make
government so small you can drown it in the bathtub. So, again,
this would be an enormous achievement for them.
Actually, social conservatives in Congress would rather be
talking about abortion and gay marriage. They do not like this.
They are also radical conservatives, but they have a different radical
conservative agenda. And moderates, such as Olympia Snow, also
do not like this because they do not agree with it.
And then there is another group-people who say, "You know
what? I would like to get reelected. Maybe this is not such a good
idea." But I think Bush personally is fascinated by this and it fits
very nicely with the Norquist kind of free market theory.
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PROFESSOR LEVINE: I think that by far the main reason that
makes sense to me is the fact there are a bunch of people that do not
care anything about the cost in benefits. They have this faith-based
belief that government is bad. This is government, and I agree with
that.
There is a deep confusion. There is a separation between
increasing national savings versus privatizing versus not having
private accounts. Those are totally separate questions. I read in the
White House Advisor yesterday that voluntary personal accounts
introduced a savings component into social security.
This is a complete lie. We do not actually say that selling bonds
and buying stocks is saving. We call that speculation. But a subset
of people really does believe these private accounts, even if you
borrow to fill them, are savings. They do not understand the
distinction that Tom pointed out.
Now the economists in the White House, Greg Mancue and
now Ben Bernanke, can tell the difference between borrowing and
spending. I do not know if the people at the Cato Institute are lying
or just do not understand it, but they do confuse these and Bush, I
think initially, clearly thought that private accounts were part of
saving social security.
I do not know if anyone has yet explained to him that
borrowing to buy stocks is not savings.
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: To echo what Peter and David said,
Bush just despises the idea of large government involvement, and
social security is as large as it gets.
Now when David talks about not adding to savings, it is almost
worse. Bush is claiming we are going to do this so that we are
effectively raising national savings, and yet he says the problem we
have is that people believe that money in the social security trust
fund is not really their money.
So on the one hand, he says we need to save more and on the
other hand, he says we need to privatize so that people think that
there is going to be money for them in retirement. But think about
that. If that was really true, if you were really telling people, "Hey,
you have a bunch of money coming to you in retirement that you
did not think was going to be there because now we are putting the
social security money into an account with your name on it," what is
that going to make people do?
They will say, "Oh, great. I have more money for retirement. I
am not going to save as much." So what we are actually going to do
is reduce national savings, not increase it and not leave it constant.
And you will also, by the way, get people, presumably working less
because they will say, "Why should I work for retirement if I have a
Spring 2006]
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
big retirement?"
So if Bush's own logic is correct, then he is going to reduce
savings, not increase it. And the funny thing is the right wing, and
not even right wing but the free market approach to social security,
asks, why give people money for retirement?
Convincing people that they are really going to have money for
retirement - if this reform really will give people money for
retirement -is going to reduce savings, not increase savings. So it is
very hard to find a rationale for the private account.
I would like to add one small thing, which is that one of you
made some reference to Clinton. Both Clinton and Vice President
Gore and Gore in his 2000 campaign, proposed private accounts.
But they proposed them in a way that was totally separate from the
social security system, which really underscores the point. These
are two separate issues.
And they did so at a time when we were flush with money,
where it was possible to conceive of the idea that you could take
some of that money to subsidize people and have private accounts
in addition to social security. That is not where we are now and the
Bush people have concatenated these two issues. They really are
analytically separate and separate as a policy matter.
DEAN SCHILLER: Who then, assuming you have a system
where you end up with private accounts, where you have money
that would have formally been part of the payroll tax that is now
dispersed to individuals right away with the expectation that they
are going to put it in a private account, benefits and who loses?
How does the allocation of assets work?
We started the discussion saying that the primary goal of social
security was to decrease the number of impoverished elderly
people. So then, the question is if you switch away from that system
to the system of private accounts, who wins and who loses?
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: The idea is we are going to create
private investment accounts in which you can invest in bonds or
you can invest in stocks. Now the first problem is if you invest in
bonds, under the current plan, although there is not really a plan yet
as I understand it, the idea is the government will allow you to
invest in a private account where you get to keep your money on
top of social security, except you owe the government interest at a
real rate of three percent per year on the money you investment.
We have the three percent real interest rate because the government
wants to set up private accounts but we are in a huge deficit. So you
cannot just give people money to invest.
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Now the problem with that is the real interest rate, when you
take out the inflation component if you save in bonds, is about 1.5
these days. So that means if you invest in bonds, you are for sure
going to have 1.5 percent a year taken away by the government in
order to get rid of the social security deficit.
So if you want to invest in the safest asset, which is an inflation
index bond, or the second-safest asset, which is a bond, you can be
confident that you will have an effective savings rate in social
security under privatization that is 1.5 percent worse than what we
have today.
So we are starting out bad. Now then you have an alternative,
you can invest in stocks. Now if you believe that markets make
sense, and you know that people both invest in bonds and invest in
stocks, then there is no free lunch by investing in stocks.
Bush likes to claim that there is a free lunch: if you invest in
stocks in your private account, you will get a higher rate of return.
It is true. On average, you will get a higher rate of return, but you
might get a much higher rate of return on bonds, or you might get
an even lower rate of return on bonds. And on average, it should be
a fair bet to go into stocks or go into bonds. You know you are
going to lose money through private accounts by going into bonds
when you account for risk, and you lose money when you invest in
stocks.
So what happens is we take away money from future retirees?
Who is that going to hurt? Primarily it is going to hurt lower
income retirees, because essentially it is going to be a transfer of
money from retirees to general revenues.
Who pays general revenues? By and large, higher income
people.
DEAN SCHILLER: Right now the thing to understand is this
analytic distinction between the problems that social security might
have in being in the red on the one hand and the private savings as a
solution on the other hand. So you have to create some way of
funding two things. First, you have to fund the accounts, because
that is the service you are providing, and at the same time, you have
to solve the problem of red ink.
PROFESSOR LEVINE: Some of you have read about "claw
back." The point there is that if you take your private account and
invest in a safe asset, then you have a benefit cut. Your other choice
is to give younger workers the opportunity to get a better rate of
return on their social security dollars. Normally, though, we focus
more on getting a better return-with stocks with bonds.
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These people who hate government and love free markets
believe that this idiotic free market will sell them $2 trillion worth of
stocks for $2 trillion worth of bonds and somehow all those free
market capitalists will come out behind on this. Now think about
that. These guys who do not like the government that well say all
the rich people are so dumb they will sell high-yielding stocks and
buy low-yielding bonds and the government could make money.
Now if this were true, the government should not just save
social security this way, they should save everything. And the
argument is you do nothing but sell bonds and buy stocks and live
off the profit. But, as Tom said, there is some down side to this.
Past returns are no guarantee of future returns. Our best
estimate is that stocks will do slightly better than bonds in the next
50 years, because they are quite a bit more risky, and when you
adjust for risk, you will pretty much break even.
There is no free lunch in finance in expected value terms, and it
is a peculiar thing for these free market people to claim that there is.
If there is this free lunch, all our taxes should be cut, not just our
social security taxes.
DEAN SCHILLER: Peter, who is winning, then?
PROFESSOR EDELMAN: If we actually do this, it may well be
that everybody loses. It is certainly true that if you take two points
out of the social security payroll tax to put the money into these
accounts, then you have to borrow a huge amount of money to pay
benefits right now to people who are retiring-the baby boomers.
That is another way of looking at the fact that we are going to
pile up, by any responsible analysis, further huge deficits in order to
do this.
Also, there is going to be a cost of administration which has not
been mentioned yet. If you look at the history of the somewhat
similar ideas as they were tried under the Thatcher-ites in the
United Kingdom in Great Britain and in Chile, there are large
administrative costs.
So there are people who benefit -the people who run the thing
and the people on Wall Street. If you have the government doing
the investing, that really is socialism. That is as scary as could be.
There is the story about Senator Vandenberg, the Republican in
Michigan. Somebody came to him in the 1940s or 1950s to suggest
using the stock market to finance social security, and he said, "That
is socialism." He was a Republican senator.
Finally, the social insurance aspects of this are going to be
hugely undercut. Right now each of us as a working person has the
equivalent of a $353,000 disability policy. We have the equivalent of
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a $403,000 life insurance policy. If they undermine the financing of
social security, that is going to be gone.
The whole idea that the lowest income people get the highest
percentage replacement of their wages is going to be severely
undercut. So to the extent that somebody benefits other than the
people who run the thing, it is a redistribution upward.
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: Let me amplify two points. It is not
a minor point that Wall Street gains. To coin another phrase that I
do not think Peter coined: follow the money if you want to know
who is supporting a policy. If you want to know who is paying for
the advocacy on behalf of social security- there are two groups.
One is the tax payers -because every time Bush goes on one of
his trips to sell social security, we have to pay for it.
But two is the financial intermediaries who are putting money
into pro-privatization commercials by the financial intermediaries -
what we know from other countries' experiences is when you set up
private accounts, it is very costly. There are management fees. Well
that is a cost to most people, but it is a very, very large gain to a very
small and concentrated number of people. And I believe this idea of
private accounts really got its impetus when Charles Schwab sat
next to George Bush at his first economics summit, and, of course,
this is a great idea for Charles Schwab. It is not a small thing, I do
not think at all, that they are the beneficiaries. I think that is the
inception of the policy. That is point one.
Point two is on progressivity; remember, I said the great thing
about social security is that it combines old age insurance with
general progressivity. So people who have less ability or worse
circumstances in life get a fair shake at the end.
With private accounts, it becomes much easier to figure out that
there is progressivity in the system. I think most people think of
social security as a system where you put money in when you are
young and you get money out when you are old. When you have a
private account, it gets a lot easier to see, you thought you put in a
dollar, but now the government is taking some of your money and
giving it to poor people.
So you add transparency, which may be a good thing, but it is
going to undermine progressivity. To some extent, this is going to
be a transfer away from the poor in the future because, people are
going to see, no they do not want to share their savings.
PROFESSOR LEVINE: In 50 years, as the private accounts
become bigger and the social security component gets smaller, it
will be very obvious that people who are discriminated against
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during their working lives, people who were shuttled off to lousy
schools and did not have much opportunity, had low earnings.
Now they retire, with progressivity this means they get the higher
replacement rate to which Peter referred.
They still get the low average benefit, but it is a higher share of
their earnings. People are going to see that and are going to be
much more politically vulnerable. So the goal is to make sure that
over the next two generations, this program is no longer thought of
as the third rail but becomes a way in which white people are
shoveling dark money to dark-skinned people one more time.
If they re-envision social security away from the image of
supporting our grannies towards the image of subsidizing poor
people who do not look like me, its political support will be greatly
diminished.
DEAN SCHILLER: Right. That is the epigram that Tom started
with; a program for the poor is a poor program. What he meant by
that is politically, it is much more, it is much less feasible to cut a
program which is seen as being a universal program that benefits
everybody as opposed to a program that is seen as redistributive
where the more powerful segment of the economy, of the society, is
paying out and the less powerful is paying in.
What has traditionally made social security the third rail of
American politics is the notion that everybody is getting it equally.
Everybody benefits. If you can succeed in changing that vision of it,
then it makes it more vulnerable.
Now what I would like to do is go down the line and ask about
alternatives or methods of solving this problem. The one thing I
would ask the panelists to do as they are addressing this is to not
only say what, perhaps, in the ideal world, they would like, but also
to address some of the politics of it.
In other words, how do you get from where we are now to a
system that is solvent and equitable? And how do you do that
politically in a realistic way? Let's start with Peter.
PROFESSOR EDELMAN: As far as social security is concerned,
we can get to a system that is solvent; it is not that difficult. In terms
of just the social security program, and the financing that we have
using the payroll tax, the social security trustees say year 2042 is the
point where the trust fund is exhausted. The Congressional Budget
Office says 2052. Those estimates are what the trust fund's actuary
calls intermediate level estimates; they are quite conservative. If
things are just slightly better in terms of economic growth, in terms
of the birth rate, so we get more workers who are paying into it, and
in terms of changes in the death rate and immigration- those are
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the four variables that they take into account -it will last for the
whole 75 years, which is the whole time frame for which they even
do the estimates.
As far as social security itself is concerned, if there is a need for
a fix, people could stand a little tax increase, and you could extend
the retirement age a little bit. There are a number of things you
could do.
You can pay the shortfall, as I mentioned earlier, out of general
revenues, or you could have a little bit of reduction in benefits.
Even after 2042, with what workers are going to be paying in on the
conservative intermediate projections, you could pay 73 percent of
the benefits that we now pay. It is not a question of the whole thing
going belly up. It is a question that you would have a shortfall to
pay. And while I do not recommend this, the experts-Paul
Krugman and others who have analyzed this- say if you just had a
1.89 percent increase in the social security tax, right now, all of the
shortfall would be gone even by the intermediate estimates.
That is just social security itself. So that is not the issue. The
issue is that we have to make some very, very tough choices as a
country in the course of the forthcoming decades. The cost of
healthcare has gotten to be fifteen percent of the gross domestic
product. It is huge. And we are already at a point where almost 50
percent of the national health care bill is paid by public dollars. I
would wager that most of you think of this as predominantly a
private system with some public funding.
That is actually not the fact right now. We already have a sum
in excess of $500 billion in public dollars (federal, state, and local) in
health care right now.
We are debating the wrong subject. And we really need to have
a national debate about health care choices, let alone any other kinds
of public spending.
DEAN SCHILLER: David?
PROFESSOR LEVINE: I can only clarify around the edges what
Peter said, because I think he outlined the issues correctly. When he
says you can cut benefits, I think the people up here would tend to
think of cutting benefits on people who are not yet retired but are
going to retire in a long time, cutting benefits on the prosperous
more than the less prosperous, maybe lowering the index for
inflation a little, and generally a slower benefit growth for
prosperous people.
Peter also talked about raising the retirement age for certain
individuals. For example, I went to college for a really long time. I
entered the workforce later than a lot of other people. It makes
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sense for me to retire later than other people. On the other hand,
people who started work right after high school, often people
working with their bodies, which is really hard to do when you are
72, may not be able to work as long. So we should think about
raising the retirement age disproportionately for people who started
work later, as I was privileged to do.
Peter talked about raising taxes. I just want to go back to a
point he mentioned at the beginning. The taxes on social security
run out at a certain point. They tax the first $90,000, so if you have
to pick a tax to raise, that is one obvious tax, if you are just worried
about social security.
As we think more broadly about general revenue, we get to the
general point that the country does not save enough. And then I
think we have a whole list of tax cuts to undo.
Now, politically how do we do this? If I knew that, we would
not be in the third Bush Administration. I am just going to say I am
not an expert on that. But I think it is really obvious that the country
has to very rapidly undo the tax cuts and get our fiscal situation into
a sustainable state.
Finally, I will just elaborate on the last thing Peter brought up.
How do you lower healthcare costs? No one has figured out a
recipe in the last generation, so let's put it more realistically -how
do you slow the growth of it? I think the answer is that it has got to
become a national priority to figure it out.
Nobody knows, so we need a lot more experimentation. What
we do not have is the idea that this is a really big priority. If we do
not know how, let's do really careful experimentation on a large
scale and figure it out. The lives of your grandchildren and your
children, as well as my own, depend desperately on figuring it out
now.
Nobody knows the right answer to this, and we have to find it
out. It requires huge research efforts and public policy experiments
on a large scale. We are not doing that research, which means we
will keep muddling along for the foreseeable future.
DEAN SCHILLER: Tom?
PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: Let me just say, first of all, I do not
want to disagree with almost anything that was just said. But let me
add something that I think we can do about fiscal responsibility and
adding national savings as we prepare for retirement.
The short words are two: land tax. That is a pie in the sky,
unrealistic idea, but let me say how important it is.
First of all, if we think about the stereotypical Democrat in the
last election, we think of a latte sipper in Marin or East Hampton.
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And if we think about the stereotypical Bush voter, we think about
someone barefoot in overalls handling snakes in a trailer park in
Kentucky. Okay?
The funny thing is that it is the former who stands to gain from
negative redistribution and it is the latter who gets hurt. As much
as we may think we have progressivity in the tax code in the United
States, in some ways we do not. Because the latte sipper on the east
and the west coasts are sitting on a lot of land value on which they
do not pay a lot of tax.
One, housing is not taxed. The rent you get from owning your
house, implicitly, untaxed. Two, you get to deduct property taxes,
which buy your fancy schools. And three, you get to deduct
mortgage interest. We have gotten away with it somehow.
We have the alternative minimum tax (AMT), which is getting
rid of property tax deductibility, but people are talking about
getting rid of that. Many Democrats say, "Oh, we have got to deal
with the AMT," and that makes the Bush tax cuts unaffordable.
While I think the Bush tax cuts are unaffordable, I am not sure
at all that getting rid of the AMT is a good idea. We might want to
extend it down.
I think that land is a great asset to tax. There are some
complicated public finance reasons why it is a good idea to tax land,
the short one being they are not making any more of it. I honestly
think this is an area which is unexplored in policy discussions and
really could be a big number thing.
DEAN SCHILLER: One of the things that strikes me about
what all three of the panelists have said is that addressing social
security is really part of addressing a whole web of issues that have
to do with how much we save, what type of social services we want
to provide, and, at base, what kind of society we want to be.
Part of me wonders what the Democrats see. It is the third rail.
Part of me worries that, to the extent that social security is like
shooting fish in a barrel, the Democrats are shying away from
looking at issues, like healthcare, that are profoundly difficult and
incredibly controversial because you have to make the type of
decisions that Peter talks about.
And part of my hope would be that what the Democrats do is
use this as a first step to try to talk about a web of reforms of which
this is a leading edge. The values that our panelists have been
talking about, like fiscal responsibility and providing for the elderly,
are not crazed, socialist, bizarre things. In fact, the Democrats could
seize this as an opportunity.
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PROFESSOR DAVIDOFF: If I may, speaking of values, I saw a
woman with a George Bush poster on election day and she was
young. I said to her, "You are too young to be for Bush." She said,
"Well why shouldn't I be for Bush?" I said, "Well, fiscal
responsibility."
And her answer to fiscal responsibility was, "Those people
ought to get a job." So somehow, people are convinced that being
mean to whomever "they" are is being mean to gays and flying the
Confederate flag. Providing fiscal responsibility is the most
important thing the government does. The rest of the policies do
not affect their lives every day.
So if we, or Democrats, want to break the coalition, we have to
somehow convince people that what the government does matters
in their everyday lives. Social security is a nice example.
PROFESSOR LEVINE: I just want to echo what others were
saying. The challenge is to take this one debate and connect it with
the values we have and bring it to everything you are doing and
saying. We believe in a better world, and I just hope you can take
this as one example where we will win. I am not sure, but I think
we will win. Take that to energize yourselves. The values we are
going to win on are the values of humans, and we can make this a
more humane planet to live on.
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